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Religion and the Law in modern pluralist states: towards a more balanced judicial 





The work presented for the Phd by publication is located within the law and religion 
sub-discipline and is committed to enhancing religious freedom. It focuses on 
manifestation of belief and is dedicated to the legal protection of religious minorities. 
It highlights the difficulties of adjudicating conflicts related to religious symbols in 
modern liberal states and aims to deepen the understanding of manifestation of belief. 
It shows that religious symbols contribute to the making of contemporary individual 
and collective identities. The thesis advocates a more contextual approach to 
manifestation of belief which views religion as an element of identity rather than an 
elective characteristic of the individual. It therefore promotes collaborations with other 
disciplines within the social sciences such as history, sociology, and anthropology in 




1. General Background & Context  
 
Religion has always had an ambivalent relationship with law. This is reflected in the 
rich and diverse literature produced by legal scholars.1 The Law and Religion discipline 
in the UK however is still in its adolescence in comparison to its US counterpart and 
some scholars consider the field to be at a stage of stagnation in part due to what has 
been termed the ‘ghettoization of law and religion.’2 It has been acknowledged that 
‘…managing the practical ramifications of the coexistence of contrasting beliefs and 
ideologies is a work in progress.’3 
 
Indeed, religion has commonly been conceptualised as an elective characteristic of 
individuals which is a matter of choice and as such has often been downgraded in 
relation to other protected characteristics such as sex, gender or disability. 4 This is 
evident from the legal approach to manifestation of belief which my thesis is critical 
of.5 I submit that the law of religion and the legal approach are rooted in liberal values 
and as such, place a large emphasis on individual autonomy. What I call the ‘liberal law 
of religion’ wrongly assumes that everyone is on an equal level playing field when it 
comes to making choices about their religion.  Recognising religion as a fundamental 
characteristic of the individual however rather than a life choice promotes the 
recognition of the right to accommodation of religious and cultural practices. Yet, there 
has been a tendency for the debate to focus on the religious vs. secular binary6 thus 
associating religious accommodation with an approach that sees religion as special or 
superior and therefore in need of special treatment.7 My thesis highlights the necessity 
to consider religion as an element of personal identity while attempting to break out of 
this binary hence moving the debate in new directions.8  I take a critical approach to the 
the existing law on religion and argue that it is possible to protect religion without 
putting it on a pedestal. I approach religion from the standpoint of manifestation of 
belief and religious symbols as it is the most controversial aspect within pluralist secular 
societies. 9  My work takes a broad interpretation to religion which includes non-
religious beliefs such as humanism, agnosticism or atheism.  
 
 
1 See for instance in the UK work by Russell Sandberg, Norman Doe, Malcom Evans, Julian Rivers, 
Rex Ahdar, Ian Leigh, Peter Edge and Anthony Bradney.  
2 Sandberg, R., Leading Works in Law and Religion (Routledge: 2019) 9. Despite a few exceptions, the 
field has remained a fairly closed group and work has been mainly disseminated in places which have 
limited its appeal to those outside of the group.  
3 Canamares, S, in Bacquet S., Religious Symbols and the Intervention of the Law: Symbolic 
Functionality in Pluralist States (Routledge: 2019), foreword.  
4 Idem.   
5 See Bacquet above n. 3 chapters 5, 6 and 7 which provide a critical analysis of the case law in 
England, France and the United States.  
6 By the secular vs religious binary, I refer to the act of classifying symbols, rituals and practices within 
one or the other category. It is this categorisation which then becomes a determining factor for 
something to be worthy of legal protection. This is discussed further throughout the commentary.  
7 See for example Evans, C., Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(OUP: 2011); Eisgruber, C. L. and Sager, L. S., Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Harvard 
University Press: 2007) 279.   
8 Religion throughout the work is taken loosely to include non-religious beliefs in line with the 
European Court of Human Right’s broad approach to religion and belief. The Human Rights 
Committee concurs with this approach in its General Comment 22 on article 18 of the ICCPR 
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 1993).    
9 Throughout my publications, pluralism is considered as an inevitable consequence of globalisation 




In keeping with the current realisation that the future of the discipline is dependent on 
a ‘deconstruct and reconstruct’ of the status quo approach10 my thesis is to move away 
from a purely legal approach to social and cultural phenomenon such as religion and 
religious manifestation and to explore the possibilities of collaborations within the 
social sciences with fields such as history, sociology and anthropology which are more 
attuned with the intricacies of religious and cultural symbols. To this end my 
publications and more specifically my monograph Religious Symbols and the 
intervention of the Law highlight the need for an interdisciplinary approach to religious 
symbols and manifestation of belief more generally.11        
 
The thesis explored through the work and this commentary is that in modern pluralist 
democracies there is an unavoidable interaction between religion and the law. This 
interaction is complex and legal discourse has mainly focused on the extent of state 
intervention with manifestation of religion in the public sphere.12 While states have 
generally been reluctant to intervene with certain aspects of religion,13 the resurgence 
of religion in the public sphere partly due to the nature of pluralist societies and partly 
due to the ‘failure’ of the secularisation thesis14 has heightened this need for regulation. 
State intervention however if not balanced against individual interests can be perceived 
as an interference with manifestation of belief and religion itself. I argue that a 
contextual approach which considers religion as an intrinsic characteristic of the 
individual is necessary in order to gain a deeper understanding of modern individual 
and collective identities and their relationship with the manifestation of belief. I 
encourage a broad approach to religion which goes beyond the strictness of legal 
definitions15 and which is broadly inclusive of theistic and non-theistic beliefs alike, 
traditional, and non-traditional religions as well as newly established ones.16  I highlight 
inconsistencies in legal methods, review religion/state relations in three jurisdictions 
(England, France and the United States) using a comparative approach and explore the 
benefits of a multidisciplinary approach for the regulation of manifestation of belief.          
 
Symbols are at the heart of my thesis as they are the vehicle through which belief is 
manifested and as such the centre of attention in many legal disputes. Throughout my 
work, particular attention is given to religious symbols and the body (this includes 
 
10 Sandberg, R. ‘A Systems Theory Re-Construction of Law and Religion’, Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion, Volume 8, Issue 3, October 2019, 471. 
11 Bacquet, above n.3.  
12 This is evident from the vast literature on manifestation of belief in the public sphere particularly in 
relation to dress and more specifically Muslim dress. See for example:  Howard, E, Law and the 
Wearing of Religious Symbols in Europe, 2nd edition (2019: Routledge); McCrudden, C. ‘Religion, 
human rights, equality and the public sphere’ (2011) Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 13 (1), pp. 26-38 as 
well as many of the publications cited in this commentary.  
13 This is apparent in the area of judicial review (UK) for instance where religious organisations are 
regarded as private bodies and therefore not amenable to judicial review actions.  
14 The secularisation thesis is a sociological theory which emerged in the second half of the 20th century 
and which advanced that modernisation would contribute to the decline of religion and religious 
activity. See further Bacquet above n. 3 at 56.  
15 On the difficulty of defining religion see Gunn, J. ‘The complexity of Religion and the Definition of 
‘Religion’ in International Law’ (2002) Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16, 189.   
16 With this approach there is no reason why Christianity or Judaism for instance would be given more 
protection than say scientology, Jehovah witnesses or the Hare Krishna. Similarly, there is no reason 
why humanism would not be given the same level of protection than say Islam. On the potential for 
legal definitions to be inclusive or exclusive see further Sandberg, R., Religion, Law and Society, 




jewellery and clothing), religious symbols in space (religious architecture for instance) 
and religious symbols in action (this includes rituals such as baptism or circumcision). 
I propose that a contextual understanding of symbols is key to adopting a more holistic 
approach to religious manifestation.  
 
My thesis however is mindful of secularist theorists who warn against a devotional view 
of religion which considers religion and by extension religious manifestation as in need 
of special legal protection. 17  But nevertheless, it maintains that it is possible to 
accommodate religious manifestation without putting religion on a pedestal. 
Throughout my monograph, I point out that the current legal approach to religious 
manifestation is ‘discriminatory’ to groups which the law does not classify as 
‘religious’. This could be because those groups do not fit in the Western legal categories 
as in the case of orthopraxy faith or because they fall outside the traditional conception 
of ‘religion’ as in the case of groups with distinctive identities such as Goth or new 
religious movements. I suggest that a more suitable approach would not attempt to use 
the ‘legal definition’18 of religion itself but look at other indicators of a particular 
practice such as identity, culture or function rather than trying to fit symbolic 
manifestation into predetermined categories which, as discussed in my publications is 
what the law tends to do.19 I argue that by removing ‘religion’ from the equation more 
adequate protection can be offered to those beliefs and practices which go to the core 
of individual and collective identity but may not fit neatly into the legal categories.20 
Unlike some radical secularists though I do not propose to remove religion as a 
protected category altogether and argue that freedom of religion must remain as a potent 
reminder of the historical struggle for the recognition of pluralism and is a fundamental 
aspect of democracy.21  
 
My work focuses on three longstanding liberal democracies with different approaches 
to state/religion relations. The published work looks at the secular model (France), the 
establishment model (England) and the US neutrality. 22  All three countries make an 
interesting case for comparison as France lies at the more extreme/militant end of the 
secularism spectrum while the US lies at the other end with its relatively tolerant 
neutrality. England is an example of a fusion between church and state but with fairly 
secular practices and a multicultural stance. As is demonstrated by the country approach 
there is a direct correlation between how a country deals with religion and their past 
hence the need to understand the countries’ history and tradition towards religion.  
 
Inevitably and more so than other areas of law, work published in the field of law and 
religion is rarely completely neutral and tends to be approached from either a secular 
or religious perspective. This is somewhat an oversimplification as there are many 
declinations and variations within those perspectives, but I shall return to those further 
below in part 3. My own position tends to be relatively empathic towards religion but 
 
17 See further Bacquet S. above n. 3 chapter 8.   
18 The reason I refer to the legal definition in inverted commas is because there no legal definition as 
such within international law or indeed national constitutions, but it is of course subject to judicial 
interpretation which has given rise to many controversies. See further Bacquet above n. 3 at 15-20. See 
also Gunn above n. 13.  
19 See Bacquet n. 3 at 17.  
20 Winnifred Sullivan makes a similar argument in the context of the United States in The Impossibility 
of Religious Freedom (Princeton University Press: 2005) 
21 Bacquet above n. 3 at 155.  




in favour of a broad interpretation of the religious concept hence leaning towards what 
I would call a ‘pluralist benevolent secularism.’ In dealing with religion it is difficult to 
remain neutral and one’s approach is inevitably influenced by one’s lived experience. 
Having encountered both the French laïcité and the English multicultural establishment 
it is clear that my perspective has been shaped by those two legal systems and that my 
position comprises elements of both systems while studying the US approach has 
enabled me to further refine my position.23  
 
2. Research Methods  
 
The research is empirical, comparative, and interdisciplinary. It partly relies on 
interviews and focus groups I carried out for a project on modern individual and 
collective religious identities.24 As such, a number of different socio-legal qualitative 
methods have been adopted including content analysis of interview transcripts, 
documentary and case law analysis. In keeping with religious studies methodology, the 
overall approach was comparative with the geographical focus of the study being 
England, France and the United States. As Clark points out a comparative research 
approach is at the heart of religious studies and such approaches are beginning to be 
used in law and religion work.25 Law and religion is no longer an isolated field of study 
particular to the traditions and values of a single culture  and therefore comparisons can 
help to critically examine how church/state relations are handled within different 
jurisdictions and the implications of those approaches for individuals.26 While England 
and France lie at opposite ends of the spectrum in relation to their model of 
religion/state relations, the US has features of both countries. The English 
establishment model was contrasted to the French secularism (laicité) model and both 
were compared to the US’s tolerant neutrality. Three main forms of religious expression 
were explored; namely, symbols that believers wear on their body, symbols in the 
public space such as religious edifices and rituals that believers perform as a 
manifestation of their faith. Non-religious symbols were also included in the study.  
 
The originality of the method lies in the interdisciplinary approach to religious symbols 
which combines history, sociology and anthropology to provide context to the legal 
approach and enhance one’s understanding of the role of symbols in 21st century 
pluralist states. The merits of multidisciplinary approaches to Law and Religion have 
been recognised in the literature although the focus so far in the UK has been on 
understanding religion legally rather than from a religious perspective.27 The published 
 
23 The value of reflexivity in qualitative research within the social sciences has been acknowledged as a 
tool to enhance the credibility of qualitative findings. See Patnaik, E., ‘Reflexivity: Situating the 
Researcher in Qualitative Research’ (Sept. 2013) Humanities and Social Science Studies,  
Volume 2, Issue 2, pp. 98-106. 
24 See Bacquet, S., ‘Religious Symbols and the Making of Contemporary Identities’ in Sandberg. R. 
(ed.) Religion and Legal Pluralism (Ashgate: 2015).    
25 See for instance Myriam Hunter-Henin’s recently published Why Religious Freedom Matters for 
Democracy. Comparative Reflections from Britain and France for a Democratic vivre ensemble (Hart: 
2020).  
26 Clark B., ‘A comparative method for the study of law and religion: is this a defensible 
methodology?’ in Sandberg, Doe, Kane and Roberts (ed.) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Law and 
Religion (Edward Elgar: 2019). For examples of comparative studies see Doe, N., Law and Religion in 
Europe: A comparative introduction (OUP: 2011) or Cumper, P. and T. Lewis (eds.) Religion, Rights 
and Secular Society: European Perspectives (Edward Elgar: 2012).  
27 Sandberg R., ‘The lure of Luhmann: a systems theory of law and religion’ in Sandberg et al. above n. 




work presented for the PhD by publication addresses this gap.  While history, sociology 
and anthropology are used in my publications the main focus here will be on 
anthropology due to its particular significance to manifestation of belief.  This method 
has enabled me to provide new insights into the place of religion and its relationship 
with identity, community and culture.  
 
Relevance of sociology and anthropology to law and religion scholars  
 
There has been a reluctance within the Law and Religion field to engage with other 
disciplines within the social sciences28 and lawyers have tended to rely on political 
philosophy rather than social theory. Nehushtan points to this lack of engagement with 
other fields as a ‘methodological deficit’29 while Sandberg accuses the discipline of 
ghettoization 30  and alongside with Doe has called for more engagement with 
sociology.31 As explained by Sandberg, in England and Wales, Law and Religion as an 
institutionalised discipline of law and ‘academic industry’ with research networks, 
peer-reviewed journals and research centres only fully developed in the 21st century32 
however by contrast to its US counterpart, the discipline has remained an ‘inward 
looking’ ‘niche specialism’ mostly confined to law schools.33 In the US, where the 
discipline is more firmly established, there has over the years been a move to what John 
Witte has called ‘a new interdisciplinary movement.’34 It is clear therefore that the 
future of the field is dependent on opening up to other disciplines and creating 
opportunities for cooperation allowing the discipline to go beyond a purely rights based 
approach and challenge Western expectations of religion merely as a private 
endeavour.35    
 
Sandberg, Ferrari, Fokas, Cotterrell and others have acknowledged the potential for 
sociology to contribute to the field of law and religion.36 Sociology, by employing an 
interpretive approach37 has the power to bridge the gap between law and society. As 
 
28 Ferrari, S. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Law and Religion (Routledge: 2015) at 4.  
29 Nehushtan, Y., Intolerant Religion in a Tolerant-Liberal Democracy (Hart Publishing: 2015) at 1.   
30 Sandberg above n. 2 at 8.   
31 The original argument for a sociology of religion was first advanced by Norman Doe in ‘A 
Sociology of Law on Religion – Towards a New Discipline: Legal Responses to Religious Pluralism in 
Europe’ (2004) 152 Law and Justice 68. The idea was later developed by Russell Sandberg in ‘The 
Sociology of the Law on Religion’ (2007) SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/ssrn.2032647 although he 
has most recently argued against the institutionalisation of Law and Religion as a sub-discipline see 
Sandberg et al. above n. 26.  
32 There were of course precursors in the 20th century such as Robilliard, St.John A., Religion and the 
Law: Religious Liberty in Modern English Law (Manchester University Press: 1984) or Bradney, A. 
Religions, Rights and Laws (Leicester University Press: 1993) but the bulk of the existing literature in 
England and Wales blossomed post 9/11.  
33 For reflections on the development of the discipline see further Sandberg above n. 10.  
34 See further Witte, J., ‘The Study of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report’. 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 2012 14(3), 327-354.  
35 This aspect of the current approach is further discussed in section 4 on the ‘the liberal law of 
religion.’  
36 Sandberg above n. 16; Ferrari above n. 28; Fokas E., ‘Sociology at the intersection of Law and 
Religion’ in Ferrari above n. 28 at 59, Cotterrell, R. ‘The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of 
Cultural Legality’ (2008) International Journal of Law in Context 4(4): 373–84.  
37 The interpretive approach derives from Max Weber’s interpretive sociology which centres on the 
importance of meaning and actions when studying social problems. This approach entails that one 




put by Ferrari, while law is specific, sociology is discursive  and as such it can provide 
a deeper understanding of judicial discourse and attitudes as well as add nuances to 
judicial approaches thereby managing the impact of judicial approaches to law and 
religion on both individuals and groups.38 Travers and Ezzy for instance emphasise the 
value of employing an interpretive approach in researching law and religion using 
empirical research methods such as participant observation or in-depth interviews and 
suggest that this could be used to study how legal practitioners conduct cases about 
religion in secular courts.39  Whilst the value of sociological approaches has been 
recognised by law and religion scholars, they have not engaged as fully with 
anthropology.40  
 
McIvor argues that anthropological methods (especially social anthropology) can be 
applied to the field of law and religion and provide a complement to abstract legal 
concepts which may be remote from life on the ground.41 Ferrari also points out that 
engaging with the questions paused by anthropologists and other human scientists is 
unavoidable if law and religion wants to keep up with the challenges of globalisation 
and religious diversification 42  while Jivraj calls for a critical approach to religion 
deriving from anthropology, religious and critical race studies.43   
 
Anthropology seeks to understand how people and communities ascribe meaning to 
their social worlds and includes the detailed study of human culture and daily rituals. It 
provides us with a detailed knowledge of cultures and people44 and as such is well 
suited to understanding manifestation of belief. It allows legal scholars to approach 
manifestation of belief from a more informed perspective rather than making 
assumptions about for instance what is essential to a faith or culture. As such it can 
provide legal professionals and scholars with the foundation they need to approach law 
and religion from a more nuanced perspective. As argued by McIvor, anthropology 
allows for ‘the deconstruction of the social taxonomies we take for granted.’ 45 
Ethnographies such as Inge on Salafist women46 or McIvor’s47 on Evangelism can 
provide an insight into lived experience and social context that legal methods often lack 
by entering a world that would otherwise be unknown and as such subject to prejudice 
and value laden interpretation. An anthropological approach therefore can complement 
the work of law and religion scholars as it approaches religion contextually and 
 
such phenomena. This approach motivated my empirical project on religious symbols which was 
carried out in 2011/12. The results are published in Sandberg, R. above n. 24 at 113.  
38 Ferrari above n. 28 at 4.  
39 Travers M. and Ezzy D., ‘Interpretive issues in researching law and religion’ in Sandberg et al. above 
n. 26 at 219.  
40 Empirical research within Law and Religion in the UK has mainly focused on religious courts, see 
for instance ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts’ by G. Douglas, 
N. Doe, S. Gilliat-Ray, R. Sandberg and A. Khan from Cardiff University 2010/2011 (AHRC funded 
research). Although there are a few exceptions such as Inge, A, The Making of a Salafi Muslim Women 
(2017: OUP) or Alves Pinto, T. ‘An Empirical Investigation of the Use of Limitations to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief at the European Court of Human Rights,’ Religion & Human Rights (2020) 15(1-2), 
96-133.  
41 McIvor, M., Social Anthropology in Sandberg et al above n. 26 at 243.   
42 Ferrari above n. 28 at 4.   
43 Jivraj S., The Religion of Law (Palgrave: 2013) at 7.    
44 McIvor above n. 41 at 244.  
45 Idem 247.  
46 Inge above n. 40.   




historically in order to make sense of the unfamiliar and the unknown. Anthropologists 
themselves have advocated a ‘multi-contextual analytical approach’ in order to tackle 
the complexity of the law and religion relationship.48 As put by Ferrari, while lawyers 
take a practical and normative approach by looking at legislation and case law, 
anthropologists are more theoretical and descriptive performing ‘a cross cultural 
analysis of the ordering of human societies.’49 As such, anthropology provides insights 
into lived  experiences that legal methods fail to elicit. Gaining those insights would 
benefit those who are involved in law and policy making as well as judicial personnel. 
This approach is particularly relevant to my research as it allows for a ground up 
exploration of symbols which is mindful of the context and as such allows for a holistic 
approach to manifestation of belief via symbols which my thesis puts forward. These 
anthropological insights could be deployed in a number of ways from scholarly 
cooperation to anthropologists acting as experts in courts50 or providing advice to legal 
activists.   
  
Despite the benefits of an interdisciplinary approach law and religion scholars have 
been reluctant to engage with other disciplines. Adopting a multidisciplinary approach 
indeed is not without its own difficulties. Assuming competency in any field could be 
problematic and attract the legitimate condemnation of being too superficial in one’s 
approach. This is feedback I have had to consider from one of the anonymous reviewers 
of my initial book proposal. As pointed by D’Costa et al., we have all been too aware 
of the ‘jack of all trades’51 risks but we have also come to the realisation that our work 
needs to extend beyond the confines of our own discipline. It has become impossible to 
ignore the call for more interdisciplinary work and being aware of the danger will mean 
that it is even more important that we enter into a dialogue with our counterparts in the 
social sciences. As proposed by Sandberg it is time for the field to ‘zoom out.’52 
Avoiding it altogether and remaining in our comfort zones is not a solution if we want 
the field to move forward.  
 
3. The religious vs. secular binary in legal and political theory discourse 
 
In relation to manifestation of belief in the public sphere which is what my publications 
focus on, scholars have been drawn to the issue of religious accommodations and have 
debated the extent to which religious manifestation deserves special treatment.53 There 
has also been a lot of scholarship on church-state relations and whether there is an ideal 
model.54 In debating those core issues, scholars have tended to place themselves within 
a religious or secular binary. My thesis uniquely attempts to break this pattern in order 
to shift the debate in new directions not by attempting to be neutral i.e. neither secular 
nor religious but rather by defending an approach that avoids the need for categorisation 
 
48 See for instance von Benda-Beckmann, K., ‘Beyond the Law and Religion Divide: Law and Religion 
in West Sumatra’ in Turner, T.G. and Kirsch B. (eds) Permutations of Order (Ashgate: 2009) 227-46.     
49 Ferrari above n. 28 at 4.  
50 This has already taken place in asylum seekers cases. See further Good, A., Anthropology and 
expertise in the asylum courts (Routledge: 2006).  
51 D’Costa G., Evans M., Modood T, and Rivers J., Religion in a Liberal State (OUP: 2013) 2.  
52 Sandberg at al above n. 26 at 27.  
53 See for instance Eisgruber and Sager above n. 7; Laborde, C., ‘Religion and the Law: the 
disaggregation approach’ (2015) Law and Philosophy 34(6): 581-600; Koppelman, A. ‘Is it fair to give 
religion special treatment?’ (2006) University of Illinois Law Review, (3): 571.   




altogether. This section outlines some of the key features of the theories which have 
shaped my thesis.  
 
Religion as a public good – the ‘religious’ approach   
 
At one end of the spectrum is the religious approach which sees religion as special and 
therefore in need of special treatment. Ahdar and Leigh for instance take a non-neutral 
Christian perspective and advocate a level of interaction and cooperation between the 
government and religious communities.55 As such, they support exemptions from the 
general law to accommodate religious practice. Those accommodations would not in 
their view amount to special treatment but rather form part of a corrective action. Ahdar 
and Leigh recall that the plea of religionist is not to be treated differently but rather 
seriously in the sense of being understood.56 Garcia Oliva and Hall in their Religion, 
Law and the Constitution also advocate a level of cooperation between religion and the 
state. Their in-depth study of the UK Constitution leads them to conclude that the UK 
‘religious’ constitution has resulted in all faiths being treated favourably and that this 
model indirectly protects non-religious beliefs.57 I agree that with this approach it is 
possible for the state to protect religion despite the absence of a formal separation 
between religion and the state. My issue with this model however is that while it may 
function in the UK there is no guarantee that transposed elsewhere it would provide the 
same level of protection to religious minorities. 58  In particular, there is a danger with 
establishment that the majority faith will always be given a privileged position59 hence 
the need to look towards a system that offers some level of separation and neutrality 
between church and state.   
 
My thesis, to a certain extent aligns with Modood’s ‘moderate secularism’ as it is 
favourable to state recognition of religion as an element of identity alongside other 
protected characteristics.  My position differs slightly however in relation to church 
state separation as Modood’s ‘moderate secularism’ does not require a formal 
separation between church and state as long as religious authorities do not exercise any 
influence on political authorities. 60  For Modood, the reality of multiculturalism and 
the presence in Western Europe of minorities that focus on their religious identities 
require a rethinking of secularism which includes respect for difference and the 
recognition of the interdependence between public and private sphere. State recognition 
and support for religion therefore is necessary for minorities to be accommodated and 
belong to society. 61  Modood is critical of the French radical secularism which 
marginalises religion against other protected characteristics and rejects 
multiculturalism. Instead he advocates a multiculturalism that includes equality of 
treatment and respect for differences.62 This is based on a conception of religion as a 
public good which may require the state to help religion further this good.63 My thesis 
 
55 Idem at 124.  
56 Idem at 13.   
57 Garcia Oliva, J. and Hall, H., Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain? 
(Routledge: 2017).  
58 For an in-depth study of manifestation of belief in England see further Bacquet above n. 3 ch. 6.   
59 This is happening in England – see the ongoing campaign of the secular society 
https://www.secularism.org.uk/disestablishment/ [accessed 25.10.20].  
60 Modood, T., Essays on Secularism and Multiculturalism (ECPR Press: 2019).  
61 Idem.  
62 Modood above n. 60 at 2.   




is not averse to the possibility of seeing religion as a public good provided it is not 
given priority above other conceptions of the good.64  
 
Religion as a force to be reckoned with - the ‘secular’ approach  
 
While some scholars see religion as a public good and argue in favour of state 
accommodations others single it out as a negative force that needs to be relegated to the 
private sphere. Nehushtan for instance, quite radically proposes that religion should not 
be tolerated in tolerant-liberal democracy.65 It is interesting that the author makes the 
assumption that liberal democracies are necessarily tolerant. I shall return to this point 
later on in section 4.  For Nehushtan, religion should be singled out for negative or less 
favourable treatment because it is illiberal and intolerant and as such has no place in 
liberal democracies. Nehushtan explains that the link between religion and intolerance 
is the result of seven characteristics including that religion’s main function is the 
preservation of its existence, that it aspires to gain control over its believers, that it 
perceives its characteristics as sacred, has a unique perception of the truth, is absolute 
and is always almost composed on intolerant value.66 As a result, states should be 
reluctant to accommodate religious demands and non-religious demands should be 
treated more favourably.  His argument is based on a conception of religion as 
potentially dangerous. The State therefore should be suspicious of religion. In his view, 
the tolerant liberal state has a right to encourage its citizens from choosing a secular 
way of life over a religious one as this will further its aim of reinforcing its liberal and 
secular values.67 The problem with this approach is that the liberal secular state as 
described by Nehushtan has an inherent bias against religion which it is encouraged to 
view as intolerant. This in itself makes the so called tolerant liberal state become 
intolerant.68 Nehushtan’s theory may be used to provide a justification to the French 
approach which results in a militant and extreme form of secularism which pushes 
religion away from the public sphere. My thesis is critical of this perspective as it places 
the secular above the religious and presupposes a view of religion which is purely 
dogmatic and as such ignores religion as culture and identity.69 While I agree with 
Nehushtan that religion should not be given special treatment I do not suggest that it 
should be given any less values than other conceptions of the good. It is enough that 
legal restrictions are placed to control and limit the excesses of religion which may be 
harmful to the public or private sphere. But not all secularists see religion as a negative 
force.  
 
My thesis aligns better with the view of political theorist Laborde who is also against 
providing religion with special treatment but does not go as far as excluding or 
marginalising religion. Laborde’s justificatory secularism like Modood’s moderate 
secularism is compatible with state recognition of religion but only with a 
mild/symbolic form of establishment.70 The key aspect of justificatory secularism is 
that there should be no imposition of religious norms by the State. Any State actions, 
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laws and policies should not be justified by religious truths. Laborde’s justificatory 
secularism however is mild and as such she too sees the demands of French secularism 
as illegitimate because it places an obligation of restraint on citizens as well as state 
officials. 71  Moreover, Laborde acknowledges the religious origin of our political 
morality and does not negate the value of bringing all perspectives including religious 
ones within public debates. Justificatory secularism therefore unlike more extreme 
forms of secularism does not have on its agenda the secularisation of society. In that 
sense it is more likely to promote religious freedom than its more militant counterparts 
such as the French laïcité.  
 
While those theories are useful in understanding the complexities of the interaction 
between church and state and as such informing a legal approach my thesis takes a step 
back and questions the very essence of religion in order to enhance our understanding 
of the need for state recognition and religious accommodation.     
 
4. Theorising Manifestation of Belief in modern pluralist states  
 
My research aims to shed some light on the importance of manifestation of belief 
through symbols and seeks to look at religion and religious manifestation as an element 
of individual and collective identity. This would result in a conception of symbols as 
an aspect of identity rather than merely a religious requirement or on the other hand a 
secular artefact. As such, my thesis distances itself from the above religious vs secular 
debate and delves into the social meaning of manifestation of belief. By focussing on 
religion as an aspect of identity we are able to move away from this binary and focus 
on individuals rather than seeking to protect religion per se.  
 
My thesis recognises that the law and religion relationship is deficient, and this is 
reflected in the courts approach to manifestation of belief which has led to 
inconsistencies in decision making and to judges often being perceived as arbiters of 
faith. 72  I argue that judicial approaches can benefit from looking at religion and 
religious manifestation from different angles in order to gain new understandings of 
what manifestation of belief means to individuals. In assessing whether manifestation 
ought to attract the protection of the law, judges have often resorted to categorising 
manifestation as either religious or secular.73 As a result, manifestation of belief that 
was deemed by the courts as non-religious has at times been rejected giving a message 
to followers that it may not be worthy of protection74 while religious symbols have been 
classed as ‘cultural’ in order to garner the acceptance of the secular state.75 Throughout 
my study it becomes apparent that the law has an inadequate view of religious symbols, 
yet this view is based on what I call the ‘liberal law on religion.’ In the next section I 
explore the origin and nature of this approach.  
 
 
71 Idem. See also Bacquet above n. 3 chapter 5.  
72 See further Bacquet above n. 3 chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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(Admin); Eweida v British Airways plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80 CA in the UK or Lautsi and Others v. 
Italy, (App no. 30814/06) 18 March 2011 at the ECtHR level.  
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The Law on Religious Freedom is anchored in liberal values   
 
What I have termed ‘the liberal law of religion’76 is the existing legal framework for 
the protection of religious freedom. Religious freedom is derived from international 
human rights law including article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human 
rights can be seen as the embodiment of liberal values such as autonomy, equality and 
individualism.  As many have noted, the law on religious freedom reflects an implicit 
Christian focus on belief77 and the construction of article 9 of the ECHR is a testament 
to this. While the forum internum 78  benefits from absolute protection, the forum 
externum79 is subject to limitations and as such it has been argued that the Convention 
excludes a number of groups (orthopraxy faith) for whom it is difficult to disconnect 
beliefs from the way they wish to manifest such beliefs.80 Anthropologist Talal Asad 
rightly observes that the right to freedom of religion and belief is the product of a 
specific culture and as such it is more functional to that particular culture than others.81 
Despite our expectation that the law ought to be a neutral and objective norm, it is in 
fact value laden and this is particularly salient in relation to religious freedom. As put 
by political philosopher Plant ‘the legal and regulatory requirements of a liberal 
political order in many respects challenges religious practices and the ways in which 
religious beliefs are manifested.’ 82  To this end Plant questions whether only a 
‘liberalised’ form of religion can seek a role in a liberal society.  
 
Before moving further with this argument, it is necessary to outline the main features 
of a ‘liberal society’ and what it expects of religion.  
 
Liberalism and Religion  
 
The controversies which have emerged in relation to the place of religion in 21st century 
liberal states and which I have discussed in my publications are a testimony to the 
potential for conflicts between some forms of liberalism and more visible expression of 
religion. While liberalism initially emerged as a solution to religious conflicts and has 
liberty at its core, some of its values may be ambivalent with religion. There are 
multiple declinations of liberalism and attempting to define them all is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but it is interesting to look at some common features which are present in 
most variants.83  
 
Adhar and Leigh identify four common attributes of liberalism which are particularly 
salient to the field of law and religion, namely individualism, rationalism, neutrality 
and the privatisation of religion. Let us now see how each of those features may impact 
manifestation of belief in 21st century modern pluralist states such as England, France 
 
76 Bacquet above n. 3 at 141.   
77 McIvor above n. 41; Jivraj above n. 43.   
78 The individual freedom to believe (article 9.1 of the ECHR).  
79 The freedom to manifest that belief (article 9.2 of the ECHR).  
80 See for instance Peroni, L. ‘Deconstructing ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg’ (2014) Oxford Journal of 
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and the United States which were the subject of my study. Individualism is at the centre 
of liberalism. As put by Tushnet the liberal state focuses on the relationship between 
the State and the individual and what he calls ‘intermediate institutions’ such as the 
family, churches and voluntary societies are accorded less importance.84 Individual 
autonomy can indeed be a difficult concept to grapple with for some religious minorities 
who tend to identify in relation to the group rather than as an autonomous being.85 Many 
conflicts which have arisen in relation to manifestation of belief have touched upon this 
notion of autonomy when the liberal state attempts to impose its liberal stance on a 
specific religious group. This has been particularly relevant in relation to Muslim 
women and dress.86 
 
The second common feature, rationalism implies that primacy is given to reason over 
feelings, emotions and superstition that characterise religion. Cook comments that 
liberalism has a ‘structural bias’ against religious knowledge.87 This is not surprising 
given that liberalism emerged post enlightenment when there was an emphasis on the 
discord between faith and reason. This is very visible within the French model which 
my research focuses on.88 The third common feature, neutrality89 means that the liberal 
state sees religion as one of the many conceptions of the good and not as something 
sacred and superior which should be given special treatment. In that respect, my thesis 
fits in within a liberal framework, but it also seeks to highlight that there is a disconnect 
between the liberal understanding of religion which tends to focus on the individual and 
the private sphere, and manifestation of belief as seen through the lens of religious 
followers i.e. as an element of individual and collective identity.  
 
The fourth common feature is the privatisation of religion. This is directly linked to the 
third common feature. If the state is ‘neutral’ then there is no place for religion in the 
public domain. Religion therefore becomes a private matter hence a preference for 
secularism rather than establishment models of church/state relations. We can clearly 
see here how manifestation of belief in the public sphere becomes a salient issue in 
liberal states. The extent to which states can be neutral however is questionable and 
many scholars have accused liberalism of being biased towards secularism and against 
religion. Gedicks for instance sees the relegation of religion to the private sphere ‘as an 
exercise in power’90 while Gaus comments that ‘the liberal secular tendency to equate 
public reason with secular reason needlessly alienates those with strong religious 
commitments who might otherwise be supportive of liberalism.’91 Ahdar and Leigh talk 
about ‘the mirage of neutrality’ 92  and are critical of a secularist liberalism. 93  My 
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88 On the French model see Bacquet above n. 3 chapter 5.  
89 While neutrality is common to many conceptions of liberalism it is not always the case – see for 
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research goes some way towards evidencing some of those criticisms. The French 
State’s claim to neutrality for instance is highly questionable and my analysis of the 
French system concludes that it is more favourable to non-religious than religious 
views 94  - this can be termed the secular bias. On the other hand, the American 
secularism tends to be more benevolent towards religion but its neutrality is 
questionable as it tends to lean more towards religious than secular views.95  
 
The extent to which liberalism is compatible with religious manifestation in the public 
sphere therefore very much depends on states’ interpretations of the various elements 
which contribute to a liberal state. My thesis is supportive of the liberal state but 
highlights certain deficiencies in relation to how the ‘liberal law of religion’ approaches 
manifestation of belief.  To return to the above question on what a liberal state expects 
of religion then it appears that it is more suited to more discreet and private forms of 
religions which do not have a strong emphasis on manifestation. In modern pluralist 
societies where diverse faith communities coexist this represents a major challenge and 
has been amply evidenced within the courts.96     
 
The ‘liberal law of religion’ therefore favours orthodoxy faith such as Christianity. My 
thesis proposes that by taking a holistic approach to manifestation of belief we can close 
the gap that currently exists between the law’s conception of manifestation of belief 
and religious symbols and religious individuals and communities’ views of the same. I 
argue that this requires a shift of approach from religion to both individual and 
collective identity.  
 
Religion as Identity  
 
My findings were that throughout history, religious or cultural symbols and rituals have 
shaped human consciousness by making them aware of their individual and collective 
identity.97 In modern pluralist states symbols and rituals contribute to the making of 
individual and collective identity.98 It is now well established that religion has not 
disappeared with modernity as predicted by sociologists in the second half of the 20th 
century. The transformation of religion99 that we are witnessing has brought about 
many challenges for states not least having to deal with the threat posed by extremism 
and fundamentalism. Although those extreme forms of religious manifestation go 
beyond the scope of my research, I have pointed out that they have contributed to the 
negative stereotyping of religion in its most visible forms.100 This is particularly salient 
in the three countries which I have studied in my publications.  
 
Against this background scholars who work in the field have started to acknowledge 
the emergence of religion as an intrinsic aspect of identity rather than an elective 
characteristic of individuals.101 In the UK, this is reflected in the legislation with the 
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Equality Act 2010 which lists religion alongside the other protected characteristics such 
as sex, gender, age, race or disability.102 My empirical research provides evidence to 
support a shift in approach from seeing religion as a chosen characteristic to an aspect 
of identity which is innate.103 I have argued that religiosity of an individual is both 
acquired through birth status (ascribed) and developed throughout upbringing and 
family history (achieved) and that in some cases manifestation of belief through 
religious symbols or rituals are to be considered as intrinsic characteristics of 
individuals.104  The Sikh turban is a good example of a religious symbol that believers 
consider as part of their body.105   
 
Eisenberg has discussed how understanding religion as identity as opposed to religion 
as choice affects public decision making about religious freedom. 106  While she 
acknowledges that the identity framework just as the choice one is imperfect, she 
nonetheless posits that the identity approach is more effective at ‘tracking social 
exclusion and historical injustice towards groups.’107 With religion as identity there is 
a greater impetus for the state to respect religious manifestation whereas with religion 
as choice the focus is on removing any barriers which prevent the individual from 
choosing their religion and the way they manifest their belief.108 The French laïcité 
which I have studied is a classic example of a state that considers religion as a choice 
and it goes a step further in actively seeking to ban practices which it sees as potentially 
restricting the choice that the individual ought to have as an autonomous being. In that 
approach religion as identity is lost and many religious minorities are left with choosing 
between protecting the law of the state or following the law of God. As a result of this 
overly simplistic and binary understanding of autonomy, minorities are discriminated 
upon and not afforded the recognition they should expect from a democratic society.109  
 
As Jivraj comments, this conceptualisation of religion linked to identity and community 
has not yet been fully explored despite its importance to understanding contemporary 
religion.110 To this end, my publications shed light on the complex relationship between 
individuals and manifestation of belief in contemporary pluralist states. More of this 
understanding is needed in order to operate a shift in approach from seeing religion as 
merely a matter of choice to acknowledging it as an aspect of identity alongside other 
social values. In the final section of this paper I explore how I propose for this shift to 
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5. Beyond the ‘liberal law of religion’  
 
Theoretical standpoint  
 
My thesis posits that legislators and courts have a tendency to see religion as a choice 
and that this approach is consistent with the ‘liberal law of religion’ which greatly 
values the right of the individual as an autonomous being able to make choices about 
his/her religion. This approach however, as discussed in this commentary, wrongly 
assumes that every individual has access to an equal level playing field. While this trend 
is mostly evident within the French approach to religious freedom, it can also be 
observed in both the US and UK courts’ approaches which I have discussed in my 
publications.111 This perspective also makes a number of assumptions about religion 
and belief more generally. It considers religion as an elective characteristic of the 
individual rather than an intrinsic aspect of identity alongside race, ethnicity, or gender. 
This perpetuates misconceptions about manifestation of belief and portrays religious 
symbols and rituals as non-essential artefacts which can easily be separated from belief. 
Belief therefore in the eyes of the legislator and the courts takes precedence over 
manifestation. I have highlighted that while this is less likely to be an issue with 
Christianity which is the majority faith in Western democracies it has the effect of 
disadvantaging religious minorities such as Muslims, Jews or Sikhs for whom belief 
and manifestation cannot be separated and whose followers can usually be identified 
by their dress. As put by Ahdar and Leigh, the dominant position is one of suspicion 
towards what they call ‘strong religions’ with ‘serious manifestation’ of belief.112 This 
is particularly salient in respect of Islam and more visible religious garbs generally.113 
In that respect I agree with Eisenberg who points out that ‘the role of the court is not to 
question whether individuals are free to choose, but rather to accept the individual’s 
religious commitments as given and then to ask whether the state treats individuals with 
these commitments with equal respect.’114 The claim here therefore is not for religion 
to be given special treatment but rather equal treatment which is consistent with my 
thesis.   
 
While some judges have warmed to this approach,115 the dominant perspective remains 
the ‘choice approach’ arguably because legal methods have not provided us with the 
tools to understand the meaning and value of manifestation of belief through symbols 
and rituals. While there is ample academic literature on the problematic nature of the 
legal approach to religious manifestation,116 few have attempted to offer any practical 
solutions.117 My thesis proposes a shift of approach by opening up to other disciplines 
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which have the power to transform our understanding of symbols but it also begins a 
discussion on how this shift would operate in practice and in that sense it moves the 
field in new directions.  
 
Before discussing the practicalities of this approach, it is necessary to come back to 
some of the most problematic features of judicial approaches to manifestation of belief. 
When more visible forms of manifestations find themselves in the court room it too 
often becomes a case of deciding two things. First, whether the symbol in dispute is 
actually a manifestation of religion and second, whether said manifestation is an actual 
requirement of the claimant’s religion or belief. This amounts to categorising symbols 
and manifestation into either the secular or the religious and is an attempt to assign a 
‘true’ meaning to symbols. I agree with Scharff that methods of judicial interpretation 
are disconnected from the very essence of symbols. While lawyers are in search for a 
single or true meaning, symbols are based on cultural assumptions and are context 
dependant.118 In other words, symbols may mean different things to different people at 
different times. Any attempt therefore by the courts to attribute a ‘true meaning’ to a 
symbol has the potential to exclude those who do not align with this interpretation.  It 
is impossible to decipher the true meaning of a symbol without unwrapping the layers 
of history which have shaped it.119 In the next section I begin a discussion on how we 
could start to operate a shift towards a more balanced judicial approach to manifestation 
of belief through symbols.  
 
Practical standpoint  
 
I put forward that the first step towards acknowledging the value of manifestation of 
belief as an aspect of identity in 21st century pluralist states is to gain a thorough 
understanding of the place of religion within secular societies. I argue that legal 
methods alone cannot provide this understanding and that therefore collaborations with 
other disciplines within the social sciences must become the norm. I have proposed that 
anthropology and sociology are particularly relevant to religious symbols but there are 
of course other disciplines which can assist us in this endeavour such as for instance 
history, psychology or theology.   
 
The second step is to adopt what I have termed ‘a holistic approach’ to religion and 
manifestation of belief which shifts focus from religion itself towards the person both 
as an individual and as a member of the community. This approach is ‘holistic’ because 
it is above all contextual and looks at individuals and their symbols within the wider 
environment rather than in a vacuum.     
 
In order for this ‘holistic approach’ to operate in practice, a modification of existing 
legal tests would be required so as to give effect to a more human and inclusive method. 
Currently, the test used by the ECtHR which is also the test used by UK courts focuses 
on the extent to which the right to freedom of religion and belief (article 9) is engaged, 
whether there has been a restriction placed on that right and the extent to which that 
restriction can be justified taking into account the nature and purpose of the restriction. 
It is the first two limbs of the test which are the most problematic and which run the 
risk of judges becoming arbiters of faith. The holistic approach would instead question 
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the extent to which a particular action, ritual or symbol is essential to a person’s 
identity. 120  This would entail using a more subjective test asking whether the 
manifestation in question is central to the individual’s life and wellbeing considering 
such factors as race, ethnicity, family life, expression, identity as well as religion. This 
would take away the need for the courts to elucidate whether a particular symbol is 
indeed a manifestation of the belief in question and therefore also move away from the 
need to define religion altogether.  
 
I propose that the approach used by the UK Employment Tribunal in determining a 
philosophical belief is more suitable. Following the test used in Grainger PLC v 
Nicholson,121 courts would need to have regard to the honesty of the belief, its weight 
and substance in relation to human life and behaviour as well as its seriousness, cogency 
and importance. In addition, the belief must be worthy of respect in a democratic society 
and compatible with human dignity and fundamental human rights.  Using an approach 
which incorporates some elements of the Grainger test would guard against opening 
the floodgates and ensure that offensive and dangerous symbols are prohibited.122  
 
It is interesting to consider whether this approach would have changed any of the 
decisions on symbols which have been made to date.123 In Eweida v British Airways 
plc124 for instance it was first held by a UK employment tribunal following advice from 
religious experts, that the visible display of Nadia Eweida’s cross was not a requirement 
of the Christian faith. Here we have a ‘secular’ tribunal declaring that clearly some 
symbols are more important than others as well as openly siding with the religious 
experts and therefore implying that there is only one way of practicing ones’ faith. 
Further up, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales refused to consider article 9 
altogether referring to the ‘specific situation rule’125 and the contractual relationship 
between Ms Eweida and her employer British Airways. The decision was eventually 
overturned by the ECtHR which found a violation of article 9 and accepted that Ms 
Eweida’s behaviour was indeed a manifestation of her religious belief as well as 
acknowledging that ‘[Her] desire to manifest her religious belief … is a fundamental 
right: because a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and 
diversity; but also because of the value to an individual who has made religion a central 
tenet of his or her life to be able to communicate that belief to others.’126 Strasbourg’s 
decision in this case is a major step forward in acknowledging the importance of 
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manifestation of belief but unfortunately in matters of religious freedom is one of the 
rare cases where the ECtHR overruled the decision of a member state. Cases like 
Eweida therefore remain an exception.127 Applying the holistic approach here would 
have meant that the case might have been resolved at the Employment Tribunal. Ms 
Eweida’s cross was discreet and had no impact on health and safety. Moreover, there 
was evidence that her Sikh counterparts were allowed to wear a turban and upon 
authorisation a kara bangle while her Muslim colleagues could wear a hijab provided it 
was in British Airways approved colours.128  
 
Similarly, in R (Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School129the High Court of 
England and Wales refused to acknowledge that Miss Playfoot’s purity ring could be a 
manifestation of her belief in chastity before marriage while in R (on the application of 
Watkins-Singh) v Governing Body of Aberdare Girls' High School130 Sarika Singh’s 
kara bangle was seen as a requirement for baptised Sikhs and as such it could attract 
the protection of the law. Moreover, in the famous Begum case131 the House of Lords 
at least accepted that article 9 of the ECHR was engaged but was still not prepared to 
admit that the restriction by the school to allow Shabina to wear a jilbab represented an 
interference with her right to manifest her belief.132   
 
Had the holistic approach been used, the reasoning if not the outcome of all of the above 
cases would have greatly differed. As they stand, those decisions may lead us to 
conclude that a kara bangle is a ‘true’ religious symbol whereas a purity ring and a 
jilbab are not. Considering all the circumstances of the case however and focusing on 
the individuals concerned rather than the symbols themselves is likely to yield different 
results. All those symbols could reasonably be linked to the claimants’ identity, religion 
and culture. This is not to say however that they could not be limited if there was a 
proportionate justification based on health and safety, harm to others or discrimination 
but a more holistic approach would at least go some way towards acknowledging 
religion as an integral part of identity. To the same end, Cumper and Lewis have 
proposed an approach that uses empathy and ‘a fresh willingness [for the ECtHR] to 
‘stand in the shoes’ of those who wish to manifest their faith through the religious attire 
of their choice.’133  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
While the holistic approach would need thorough testing and fine tuning and is bound 
to have its own limitations it would go some way towards addressing the existing 
concerns with how the law has dealt with religious manifestation. It would acknowledge 
 
127 On the ECtHR and the consequences of applying the margin of appreciation see further P. Cumper 
and T. Lewis, ‘Empathy and Human Rights: The Case of Religious Dress’, Human Rights Law Review, 
2018, 18, 61–87. 
128 Eweida case above n. 126 at §11.  
129 [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin). 
130 [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin). 
131 Above n. 115.  
132 For a critique of this series of cases see further Bacquet S. ‘School uniforms, religious, symbols and 
the Human Rights Act 1998: the 'purity ring' case,’ 2008. Education Law Journal. 9 (1), pp. 11-18 and 
Bacquet, S., ‘Manifestation of Belief and Religious Symbols at School: Setting Boundaries in English 
Courts’. 2009. Religion and Human Rights. 4 (2-3). 




the subjective importance of the belief being manifested by the person concerned as 
well as weigh the consequences of restricting such belief.  
 
Until such a shift is operated religious minorities will be left with an ‘impossible 
compromise’134 that of either abandoning their religious identity in order to fit in with 
the secular practice of the state or fighting for their religious identity and risk being 
excluded from society altogether. Throughout my publications I have demonstrated that 
‘the liberal law of religion’ is more favourable to traditional forms of religion and 
privileges orthodoxy faith resulting in the alienation of minorities. I have shown that 
legal methods of analysis are not suited to the nature of religious symbols and have 
proven to be inadequate. Comparative and interdisciplinary approaches provide a more 
nuanced and richer way of looking at the topic.  
 
My thesis puts forward an approach which acknowledges the centrality of the individual 
and their experience of the symbol but also accepts the collective nature of religion and 
other value systems as underpinning the individual understanding, it allows for the 
symbol or practice to be prohibited if there is harm to the community. It acknowledges 
that individual identity is constructed by drawing on religious and other social values 
based on race, nationality or ethnicity. Symbols are deeply rooted in these values and 
should be respected. With this conception, it is individuals’ values that need to be 
protected as a conception of the good rather than religion as a collective endeavour per 
se.  
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